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Enforceability of Ad Hoc Arbitration
Agreements in China:
China's Incomplete Ad Hoc
Arbitration System
Tietie Zhangt
Today arbitration is the dominant method for resolving international
commercial disputes. The international commercial arbitration system
based on the New York Convention effectively facilitates resolution of
cross-border disputes and contributes to the world's continuing economic
development. Ad hoc arbitration has many advantages over institutional
arbitration that make it a preferred way to resolve commercial disputes in
many contexts. China, an emerging economic superpower, is also an active
player in the field of arbitration. The People's Republic of China Arbitra-
tion Law (Law), however, requires that parties appoint an arbitration insti-
tution in their arbitration agreement. Otherwise, their ad hoc arbitration
agreement is invalid. Interestingly, this strict requirement does not mean
Chinese courts will never enforce an ad hoc arbitration agreement. Given
arbitration's "international" nature, parties can freely agree to arbitrate
outside China where ad hoc arbitration is accepted and/or choose a differ-
ent law to govern their arbitration agreement's validity when arbitrating
inside China. The Supreme People's Court of China respects such contrac-
tual freedom and adopts a choice-of-law rule that enables Chinese courts to
enforce many ad hoc arbitration agreements. A comparative study of arbi-
tration's history in China as well as China's social and economic structures
at the time of the Law's promulgation reveals the true reasons behind the
Law's hostility towards ad hoc arbitration. As China participates more
fully in globalization, this bizarre requirement will need to change. A sys-
tematic analysis shows this change would require a whole-scale rewriting
of the Law and revision to many other relevant Chinese laws.
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Introduction
Instead of being merely an alternative dispute resolution mechanism,
today arbitration has become the dominant method to resolve international
commercial disputes.' The international commercial arbitration system
based on the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) has evolved into a
highly efficient and effective legal framework that greatly facilitates resolu-
tion of cross-border disputes and, therefore, contributes to the world's con-
tinuing economic development. 2
There are multiple ways to categorize commercial arbitration. Depend-
ing on whether or not the arbitration proceeding is administered by an
established organization, arbitration could be classified as either institu-
tional, where "the proceedings are administered by an organization, usually
in accordance with its own rules of arbitration,"3 or ad hoc, meaning that
"there is no formal administration by any established arbitral agency;
instead the parties have opted to create their own procedures for a given
arbitration."4
1. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE, LARS KIRCHHOFF & GABRIELE SCHERER, ARBITRA-
TION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 27 (2d ed. 2006); Gerald Aksen, Arbitra-
tion and Other Means of Dispute Settlement, in INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: A
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO WORKING WiTH FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD 287,
287-88 (David N. Goldsweig & Roger H. Cummings eds., 1990) [hereinafter Aksen,
Arbitration].
2. See BUHRING-UHLE, KIRCHHOFF, & SCHERER, supra note 1, at 57-60; Kofi Annan,
Sec'y Gen. of the U.N., Opening Address Commemorating the Successful Conclusion of
the 1958 United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, in
ENFORCING ARBITRATION AwARDs UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND
PROSPECTS, at 1-3, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.2 (1999), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/NYCDay-e.pdf; Gloria Miccoli, International
Commercial Arbitration, AM. SoC'Y INT'L L., http://www.asil.org/erg/?page=arb#id.8000y
f4mkmkr (last updated Jan. 20, 2013).
3. Gerald Aksen, Ad Hoc Versus Institutional Arbitration, ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL.,
June 1991, at 8, 8 [hereinafter Aksen, Ad Hoc].
4. Id.
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Ad hoc arbitration undoubtedly preceded institutional arbitration.
Long before the emergence of permanent organizations providing profes-
sional services that facilitate arbitration proceedings, ad hoc arbitration
had been in existence for hundreds or even thousands of years.5 However,
institutional arbitration remains popular among business entities.6 Due to
the intrinsically decentralized nature of arbitration, as well as parties' con-
cerns about confidentiality, it is hard to accurately compare the numbers
of cases resolved by ad hoc or institutional arbitration respectively. In gen-
eral, however, these two forms of arbitration today operate side by side in
most of the world. Although sharing most of the common characteristics
and benefits of arbitration in general, each form has certain unique
advantages.
Generally speaking, ad hoc arbitration is more flexible, more efficient,
and usually more cost-effective. 7 More importantly, the promulgation of
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in 1976 greatly facilitated ad hoc arbitra-
tion in practice." Instead of having to draft detailed rules either in advance
or after a dispute arises, parties can now easily incorporate this set of com-
prehensive and well-prepared rules by reference in their arbitration agree-
ment.9 By doing so, parties gain the benefit of ad hoc arbitration, while at
the same time avoiding risks caused by poor drafting or a failure to foresee
possible pitfalls.
Institutional arbitration, on the other hand, also has several advan-
tages. Arbitration institutions provide professional services in connection
with the arbitration and usually have a lot of experience.' 0 The institu-
tions' arbitration rules are usually well drafted and are constantly amended
to meet changes in practice." Parties can also easily adopt institutions'
standard arbitration clauses as their arbitration agreement, and courts will
typically defer to such clauses. In cases where one party is absent, courts
are usually more comfortable with enforcing a default institutional arbitra-
tion award, rather than an ad hoc award, because the institution, as a neu-
tral third party, usually supervises the process and has specific rules that
better preserve due process.12
5. See discussion infra Part III.B.
6. In 2009, CIETAC decided 1,329 cases, and the ICC approved 415 awards. 2009
Statistical Report, 21 ICC INT'L CT. ARB. BULL., 5, 15 (2010); Zhang Wei, Maozhong
Shouan Shuliang Chixu Zengzhang (fff@ J [Number of Cases Accepted
by CIETAC Continues to Increase]; FAZHI RIBAO (;gijA E) [LEGAL DAILY], Feb. 5, 2010
(China).
7. For more on the advantages of ad hoc arbitration, see Asken, Ad Hoc, supra note
3, at 8.
8. The most recent version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules was revised in
2010. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as Revised in 2010, G.A. Res. 65/22, U.N. Doc. A/
65/465 (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitra-
tion/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf.
9. See Asken, Ad Hoc, supra note 3, at 9.
10. See id. at 10-11; see also OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL FOR INT'L COMMERCE, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § LE (last revised Mar., 2005), http://
www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/arb-98.html.
11. Asken, Ad Hoc, supra note 3, at 9.
12. Id. at 12.
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The People's Republic of China (PRC), as an emerging economic
superpower, is an active player in the field of international commercial
arbitration. Yet, despite ad hoc arbitration's many advantages over institu-
tional arbitration, which makes it a preferred way for parties to resolve
their disputes in many circumstances, the Arbitration Law of the People's
Republic of China (PRC Arbitration Law) requires that parties appoint an
arbitration institution in their arbitration agreement.13 Accordingly, ad
hoc arbitration agreements are invalid per se under the PRC Arbitration
Law. This requirement clearly has profound legal significance in practice,
since arbitration's consensual nature presupposes that the arbitration
agreement is its foundation. A valid arbitration agreement is a necessary
condition for a successful arbitration, as the agreement grants jurisdiction
to the appointed arbitrator(s) and at the same time divests jurisdiction
from the courts. The validity of an arbitration agreement will also affect
the status of the ensuing arbitration award. If an award is based on an
invalid arbitration agreement, the award may be set aside by the court at
the seat of arbitration, or refused recognition and enforcement under the
New York Convention by courts in other countries.' 4 As a result, for the
purposes of successfully obtaining and enforcing an arbitration award, the
importance of the arbitration agreement cannot be overstated.
Interestingly, the strict requirement that arbitration must be institu-
tional under the PRC Arbitration Law does not mean Chinese courts will
not enforce an ad hoc arbitration agreement. In practice, parties are free to
place the seat of their arbitration outside China where ad hoc arbitration is
accepted and/or to choose a law other than the PRC Arbitration Law to
govern the validity of their arbitration agreement when arbitrating inside
China.' 5 Such contractual freedom is respected by Chinese courts.16 Con-
sequently, many ad hoc arbitration agreements have indeed been enforced
13. Zhongcai Fa ({ti) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'1 People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 16 (China) (English
translation provided by the National People's Congress, available at http://www.npc.gov.
cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm).
14. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards art. V(1)(a), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Con-
vention]; Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. Doc. A/61/453 (revising
G.A. Res. 40/72), art. 34(2)(a)(i) (Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf; Zhongcai Fa ({ft) [Arbi-
tration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994,
effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 58(1) (China) (English translation provided by the National
People's Congress, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/
content_1383756.htm).
15. See infra Part I.B.2.
16. See, e.g., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa" Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi
( W ( gig) l )5) [interpretation on
Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the "Arbitration Law of the People's
Republic of China"] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Aug. 23, 2006, effective Sept.
8, 2006), art. 16 (China).
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by Chinese courts.17 It is nonetheless true that the rejection of ad hoc
arbitration agreements under the PRC Arbitration Law has caused a great
many complicated issues in arbitration practice in China.
Part I of this Article will discuss in more detail when a Chinese court
will, and when it will not, enforce an ad hoc arbitration agreement. Part II
will analyze Chinese court practice in enforcing or rejecting ad hoc arbitra-
tion agreements and put forward a critique of that practice. Part III will,
starting from a historical perspective, explore the reasons behind China's
hostility towards ad hoc arbitration. Part IV will argue that China should
incorporate a complete ad hoc arbitration system into its arbitration law
and will suggest that making this change in Chinese law will not be easy
because it calls for a whole-scale rewriting of the current PRC Arbitration
Law, as well as for revisions of a broad range of related Chinese laws. The
Article ends with a brief conclusion.
I. Rejection and Enforcement of Ad Hoc Arbitration Agreements in
China
The distinction between ad hoc and institutional arbitration has little
legal significance in most jurisdictions in the world. Whether an arbitra-
tion agreement calls for submission of the dispute to an ad hoc tribunal or
to a tribunal working with an arbitration institution usually makes no dif-
ference as long as the agreement clearly demonstrates the parties' intent to
arbitrate. Awards rendered by ad hoc tribunals and by tribunals working
with arbitration institutions are equally binding upon the parties and
equally enforceable by courts. In any case, ad hoc arbitration awards cer-
tainly fall under, and are supported by, Article 1(2) of the New York Con-
vention, which reads, "the term 'arbitral awards' shall include ... awards
made by arbitrators appointed for each case . . . ."18
In China, however, this distinction does make a difference. To be valid
under the PRC Arbitration Law, an arbitration agreement must specify an
arbitration institution to administer the arbitration.' 9 Accordingly, ad hoc
arbitration agreements are invalid under PRC law. However, not all arbitra-
tion agreements enforced in China are subject to PRC law. The Supreme
People's Court of China (SPC) has adopted a choice-of-law rule that allows
ad hoc arbitration agreements to be enforced in China in a great many
17. See, e.g., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Fujian Sheng Shengchan Ziliao Zong
Gongsi yu Jinge Hangyun Youxian Gongsi Guoji Haiyun Jiufen Yi'an Zhong Tidan
Zhongcai Tiaokuan Xiaoli Wenti de Fuhan
1 [Reply Letter Concerning the Validity of the Bill of Lading's
Arbitration Clause in the International Shipping Dispute Case Between Fujian Province
Production Material Corporation and Jinge Shipping Co., Ltd.] (promulgated by the Sup.
People's Ct., Oct. 20, 1995, effective Oct. 20, 1995) (China).
18. New York Convention, supra note 14, art. I.
19. Zhongcai Fa ({rPRA) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 16 (China) (English
translation provided by the National People's Congress, available at http://www.npc.
gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm).
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instances. 20 To achieve this result, however, the parties must draft their
agreement carefully, particularly the provisions concerning the arbitration
seat or the law applicable to their arbitration agreement, as will be dis-
cussed below.
A. Rejection of Ad Hoc Arbitration Agreements Under Chinese Law
1. The PRC Arbitration Law's Requirement that Arbitration Be
Institutional
Relevant parts of Article 16 and Article 18 of the PRC Arbitration Law
read as follows:
Article 16
An arbitration agreement shall contain the following particulars:
(3) a designated arbitration commission.2 1
Article 18
If an arbitration agreement contains no or unclear provisions concern-
ing . . . the arbitration commission, the parties may reach a supplementary
agreement. If no such supplementary agreement can be reached, the arbitra-
tion agreement shall be null and void.22
As these provisions make clear, ad hoc arbitration agreements are
invalid under the PRC Arbitration Law. Moreover, the SPC strictly inter-
prets the institutional arbitration requirement. If, in an arbitration agree-
ment, the parties only choose an institution's rules rather than the
institution itself, the agreement may be held invalid.23 Similarly, if the par-
ties agree on two possible arbitration institutions in an arbitration agree-
ment, that agreement is invalid unless they reach a valid supplementary
agreement choosing one of the two institutions and eliminating the
other.2 4
2. Consequences of the PRC Arbitration Law's Rejection of Ad Hoc
Arbitration Agreements
As mentioned before, the PRC Arbitration Law's rejection of ad hoc
arbitration agreements has grave consequences. Not only will no ad hoc
arbitration agreement be enforced under the PRC Arbitration Law, but
20. See infra Part I.B.2.
21. Zhongcai Fa (fgpR ) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 16 (China) (English
translation provided by the National People's Congress, available at http://www.npc.gov.
cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm) (emphasis added).
22. Id. art. 18 (emphasis added). Here, however, "invalid" may be a better transla-
tion than "null and void."
23. See infra Part IL.B for a more detailed discussion.
24. Id.
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awards based upon ad hoc arbitration agreements may also be annulled
under the PRC Arbitration Law for that reason alone.
This, however, is not a conclusion without qualifications. Because
China is a contracting state to the New York Convention, under which ad
hoc arbitration is undoubtedly supported, Chinese courts are obliged to
enforce ad hoc awards made outside China.25 Of course, if the arbitration
seat is in China, meaning the New York Convention does not apply, the
prospect of having an ad hoc arbitration award enforced by Chinese courts,
although not entirely absent, is slight. Moreover, because international
commercial arbitration is a highly sophisticated system under which all
contracting states to the New York Convention may potentially be involved
and no single country can control the whole process, this extremely rare
preclusion of ad hoc arbitration under the PRC Arbitration Law may also
cause complicated consequences on the international level. 26 For example,
if the parties place the seat in China and still choose ad hoc arbitration,
will other contracting states to the New York Convention enforce the
award?27
With respect to enforcement of ad hoc arbitration agreements by Chi-
nese courts, the picture is still rather complicated. When concluding an
arbitration agreement in an international commercial transaction, parties
are, of course, free to agree on the seat of arbitration as well as the law that
will govern the validity of the arbitration agreement. The PRC Arbitration
Law does not, therefore, apply to all the arbitration agreements presented
before Chinese courts or entered into by Chinese parties. Therefore, it is
important to know in what situations a Chinese court will apply the PRC
Arbitration Law to strike down an ad hoc arbitration agreement.
B. Enforcement of Ad Hoc Arbitration Agreements in China Under
Non-Chinese Law
Although under the PRC Arbitration Law an ad hoc arbitration agree-
ment is invalid, in practice many ad hoc arbitration agreements are never-
theless enforced by Chinese courts. This outcome is achieved via a choice-
of-law rule adopted by the SPC.2 8
25. See New York Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(2); Tietie Zhang, Enforcing Ad Hoc
Arbitration Awards Under Chinese Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
26. As far as the author has been able to determine, China is one of the only coun-
tries requiring institutional arbitration.
27. For a full analysis of the enforcement of ad hoc arbitration awards made in
China, see Zhang, supra note 25.
28. See, e.g., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa" Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi
(i A WNiP A 9JANT) [Interpretation on
Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the "Arbitration Law of the People's
Republic of China"] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Aug. 23, 2006, effective Sept.
8, 2006), art. 16 (China).
368 Vol. 46
2013 China's Incomplete Ad Hoc Arbitration System
1. Choice-of-Law Rules in International Commercial Arbitration Practice
in General
Choice-of-law issues play a very important role in international com-
mercial arbitration. They are, however, also very complicated because
there could be multiple applicable laws governing different legal issues
within one arbitration case. Generally speaking, there are three fundamen-
tal issues calling for decisions on what law applies: (i) what law governs
the substance or merits of the dispute; (ii) what law governs the validity of
the arbitration agreement (treated as a separate agreement even when
occurring in a clause of a larger agreement); and (iii) what law governs the
arbitration proceeding (this law is also commonly known as the "curial
law" or the "lex arbitri").2 9 As a result of such complication, it is necessary
to carefully distinguish between different applicable laws within the same
arbitration case, even if one law may be chosen by the parties or deter-
mined by the facts in the case, to govern all of these issues.
When it comes to determining the law governing the validity of an
arbitration agreement, in international practice courts and arbitrators
adopt different approaches. Some use traditional conflict-of-laws
approaches, while others apply validity-preferring rules or adopt a special
body of transnational rules on international arbitration agreements. 30
Usually, unless parties explicitly agree on the law governing the validity of
their arbitration agreement, which is a rather rare occasion, a tribunal or a
national court will choose a law from several alternatives; theoretically,
these could include the following: (i) the law governing the merits of the
dispute; (ii) the law at the seat of arbitration; or (iii) the law at the forum
where judicial enforcement of the arbitration agreement is sought.3 1 How-
ever, "[tihere is little uniformity among either arbitral tribunals or national
courts in choosing between these alternatives."3 2 Tribunals and courts
may choose the law governing the merits of the dispute by reasoning that
the arbitration agreement, usually in the form of a clause within the larger
contract (the container contract), should also be governed by the law that
the parties chose to govern the whole contract.33 Tribunals and courts also
frequently choose the law at the seat of arbitration as the governing law,
because they consider the seat of arbitration as the strongest connecting
29. See, e.g., TIBOR VARADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANs-
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 681-84 (5th ed. 2012); Luke Zadkovich, Determining the Law of an
Arbitration Agreement, INT'L ARB. Q., (June 2012), http://www.hfw.com/International-
Arbitration-Quarterly-June-2012.
30. See FoucHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
218-40 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); JuLIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COM-
PARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 118-27 (2003).
31. See FoucHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 30, at 218-40; LEw ET AL., supra note 30, at 118-27.
32. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATER-
IALS 95 (2d ed. 2001).
33. See FoucHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 30, at 222-23; LEW ET AL., supra note 30, at 120.
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factor to this choice-of-law issue.34 Some courts may even validate the arbi-
tration agreement by relying on forum law or by declaring that the exis-
tence and validity of an arbitration agreement depends solely on the
parties' intent and not on any national law.3 5
2. Choice-of-Law Rule Adopted By the SPC When Determining an
Arbitration Agreement's Validity
The choice-of-law rule adopted by the SPC to determine the law gov-
erning the validity of an arbitration agreement is clear and straightforward.
The SPC has explicitly stated, in both cases and judicial interpretations,
that if the parties have specifically agreed on a governing law for the valid-
ity of the arbitration agreement itself, as distinguished from the substantive
law that the parties have chosen to govern the merits of the container con-
tract,36 then that chosen law shall apply.37 If they fail to agree on any such
law, but have agreed on the seat of arbitration, the law at the seat of arbitra-
tion shall apply.38 If they fail to agree on both the governing law of the
arbitration agreement's validity and the seat of arbitration, then the forum
law, i.e. Chinese law, shall apply.39
In 2010, Chinese legislators adopted the SPC's choice-of-law rule in
the Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations. The new
statute allows parties to choose the law governing the validity of their arbi-
34. See FoucHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
supra note 30, at 225-27; LEW ET AL., supra note 30, at 122-25.
35. These two approaches are the ones that the Swiss and French courts adopted,
respectively. See FoucHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION, supra note 30, at 228-30, 237-38; LEW ET AL., supra note 30, at 122-23.
36. Di'erci Quanguo Shewai Shangshi Haishi Shenpan Gongzuo Huiyi Jiyao
(J )[Minutes of the Second National Working
Conference on Adjudication of Foreign-related Commercial and Maritime Cases]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 26, 2005, effective Dec. 26, 2005), art. 58
(China) (providing that the substantive law chosen by parties to govern the merits of the
container contract cannot be used to determine the validity of the arbitration clause
within the container contract).
37. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhong-
cai Fa" Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi
(REARA ~iEM (94AR ta ) il W ) [Interpretation on
Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the "Arbitration Law of the People's
Republic of China"] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Aug. 23, 2006, effective Sept.
8, 2006), art. 16 (China); Di'erci Quanguo Shewai Shangshi Haishi Shenpan Gongzuo
Huiyi Jiyao (.z f g $ N [Minutes of the Second
National Working Conference on Adjudication of Foreign-related Commercial and Mari-
time Cases]; art. 58; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Sichuan Huahong GuojiJingji Jishu
Touzi Youxian Gongsi Su Hanguo Hanhua Zhushihuishe Maimai Hetong Jiufen Yi'an
Zhongcai Tiaokuan Xiaoli Wenti de Qingshi de Fuhan
tlf) ltgg'9-JryJE ififitr ) [Reply Letter to the Request for Instructions
Concerning the Validity of the Arbitration Clause in the Sales Contract Dispute Case
Between Sichuan Huahong International Economic and Technical Investment Co., Ltd
and Hanwha Corporation (Korea)] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Aug. 24, 2007,
effective Aug. 24, 2007) (China).
38. See sources cited supra note 37.
39. See id.
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tration agreement, and when parties fail to identify the governing law, the
statute provides that the law of the place where the arbitration institution
resides or the seat of arbitration shall govern.40 Although the statute offers
a choice-of-law rule that slightly differs from the SPC's in that it mentions
"the law at the place where the arbitration institution resides,"4 ' one can
expect that the SPC's choice-of-law rule will continue to be the primary
authority for Chinese courts when determining the validity of an arbitra-
tion agreement because the SPC's rule is not inconsistent with the new
statute.
Accordingly, in a case where the validity of an arbitration agreement is
being challenged before a Chinese court, the PRC Arbitration Law may not
be applicable. The foregoing discussion demonstrates that it only applies
where (i) the parties agree that Chinese law shall govern the validity of the
arbitration agreement; (ii) the parties have not agreed on the law governing
the validity of the arbitration agreement but nevertheless have agreed that
the seat of arbitration is in China; or (iii) the parties fail to agree on either
of these two issues. Therefore, it could be reasonably inferred that in many
cases before Chinese courts in which the validity of an ad hoc arbitration
agreement is being challenged, the ad hoc arbitration agreement will not be
invalidated just because it does not call for institutional arbitration. Such
an arbitration agreement will still be enforced by a Chinese court as long
as the parties have either specifically chosen a law governing the arbitra-
tion agreement's validity that allows for ad hoc arbitration or agreed to a
seat of arbitration where ad hoc arbitration is allowed by the arbitration
law of the seat.
3. The SPC's Historically Consistent Attitude Towards Enforcement of Ad
Hoc Arbitration Agreements
Even before formulating the choice-of-law rule discussed above, the
SPC was willing to enforce arbitration agreements calling for ad hoc arbi-
tration outside of China. In October 1995, only two months after the PRC
Arbitration Law took effect, the SPC enforced an arbitration agreement call-
ing for ad hoc arbitration. In its Reply Letter42 to the Higher People's
Court of Guangdong Province, the SPC said the following, in literal
translation:
In foreign-related cases where parties have agreed in the contract in
advance or reached an agreement after the dispute occurs that the dispute
should be arbitrated by a foreign ad hoc arbitration institution or non-per-
manent arbitration institution, the validity of such an arbitration agreement
40. Shewai Minshi Guanxi Falt Shiyong Fa ( [Law on
Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011), art. 18 (China).
41. Id.
42. Reply Letters are a form of judicial interpretation issued by the SPC to interpret
Chinese laws in judicial practice. The SPC usually uses Reply Letters to answer lower
courts' questions of law in certain cases as to how Chinese law should be interpreted
and followed under the particular circumstances in those cases.
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should be recognized in principle. The court shall not accept the case.43
The language "ad hoc arbitration institution" is confusing because the
SPC seems not to have used the correct terminology. Perhaps starting from
the presumption under the PRC Arbitration Law that all arbitration is insti-
tutional, the SPC referred to the arbitration tribunal as the "arbitration
institution." However, in the above paragraph, the SPC presumably meant
ad hoc arbitration "tribunals" when referring to ad hoc arbitration "institu-
tions." Furthermore, the SPC was not explicit on what it meant by a "for-
eign" tribunal. It seems that the SPC also presumed that if a dispute is
submitted to an ad hoc tribunal composed of non-Chinese citizens, the seat
of such arbitration would be located outside China. Since most places in
the world allow ad hoc arbitration, the SPC stated that "the validity of such
an arbitration agreement should be recognized in principle."44
As a result, an alternative translation that better captures the SPC's
intended meaning would be as follows:
In foreign-related cases where parties have agreed in the contract in
advance or reached an agreement after the dispute occurs that the dispute
should be arbitrated by an ad hoc arbitration tribunal or non-permanent
arbitration tribunal having its seat outside China, the validity of such an
arbitration agreement should be recognized in principle. The court shall not
hear the case on its merits.
In conclusion, despite the PRC Arbitration Law's requirement that par-
ties specify an institution in their arbitration agreement, the SPC has con-
sistently interpreted the law in a way that renders this requirement
applicable only to domestic arbitration. As shown above, the SPC has
always been willing to enforce arbitration agreements calling for ad hoc
arbitration outside China. Indeed, the choice-of-law rule later adopted by
the SPC has further increased the range of ad hoc arbitration agreements
that the SPC is willing to enforce; as long as the parties agree on a non-
Chinese law to govern the validity of the arbitration agreement or specify
the seat of arbitration outside China, a Chinese court will enforce the arbi-
tration agreement. The Law on Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil
Relations reinforced the SPC's choice-of-law rule.4 5
43. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Fujian Sheng Shengchan Ziliao Zong Gongsi yu
Jinge Hangyun Youxian Gongsi Guoji Haiyun Jiufen Yi'an Zhong Tidan Zhongcai
Tiaokuan Xiaoli Wenti de Fuhan
f i [Reply Letter Concerning the Validity of the Bill of Lading's
Arbitration Clause in the International Shipping Dispute Case Between Fujian Province
Production Material Corporation and Jinge Shipping Co., Ltd.] (promulgated by the Sup.
People's Ct., Oct. 20, 1995, effective Oct. 20, 1995) (China) (translation by author).
44. Id.
45. See Shewai Minshi Guanxi Falh Shiyong Fa ( [Law on
Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011), art. 18 (China).
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11. Analysis and Critique of the SPC's Approaches to the PRC
Arbitration Law's Requirement that Arbitration Be
Institutional
A. Analysis of the SPC's Choice-of-Law Rule
1. A Generally Validity-Preferring and Pro-Arbitration Rule
Undoubtedly, by limiting the situations in which the PRC Arbitration
Law applies and expanding the number of situations in which non-Chinese
law applies, the SPC has demonstrated its pro-arbitration stance. A careful
analysis will show that the choice-of-law rule the SPC adopted may, in
effect, ensure that ad hoc arbitration agreements are enforced by Chinese
courts to the largest extent allowable by the statute. Therefore, the rule
should be characterized as validity-preferring and pro-arbitration.
In theory, as previously mentioned, when an arbitration agreement's
validity is being challenged before a Chinese court, the possible options for
applicable laws that the court may choose from include: (i) the law explic-
itly chosen by the parties to govern the validity of their arbitration agree-
ment; (ii) the law governing the substance of the container contract; (iii)
the seat law; or (iv) the forum law. First, the consensual nature of arbitra-
tion requires that a court should initially consider the law explicitly chosen
by the parties. Second, because of the PRC Arbitration Law's bizarre
requirement that arbitration must be institutional, if a Chinese court wants
to adopt a validity-preferring approach to ad hoc arbitration agreements,
then the law of the forum (i.e., Chinese law) should be avoided to the
extent possible. Consequently, the forum law should be the last to be con-
sidered. Accordingly, if the court should find that the law chosen by the
parties does not apply, the more difficult choice is between (ii) and (iii)-
the law governing the container contract and the law of the seat.
There are four possible scenarios based on different combinations of
the location of the seat of arbitration and the governing law of the
container contract: (a) the seat of arbitration is China, and the governing
law of the container contract is also Chinese law; (b) the seat of arbitration
is China, and the governing law of the container contract is a non-Chinese
law; (c) the seat of arbitration is outside China, and the governing law of
the container contract is Chinese law; and (d) the seat of arbitration is
outside China, and the governing law of the container contract is a non-
Chinese law. As far as the author has been able to determine, no other
country's domestic law mandates institutional arbitration. Thus, for the
purposes of the analysis in this Article, we shall assume that no non-Chi-
nese law will invalidate an ad hoc arbitration agreement simply because it
is ad hoc. In scenarios (a) and (d), the choice between the governing law of
the container contract and the seat law makes no difference in terms of
validating an ad hoc arbitration agreement, because they both point to the
same law. It is only in scenarios (b) and (c) where a choice between the
law governing the contract and the law of the seat will lead to a different
result.
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Because the hypothetical ad hoc arbitration in scenario (b) will take
place in China, even if the arbitration agreement was valid under the non-
Chinese law, the ad hoc arbitration would likely still be inoperative unless
the parties were able to reach an explicit and complete agreement on
almost every detail of the arbitration proceeding or they chose a non-Chi-
nese law as lex arbitri.4 6 Because the PRC Arbitration Law is silent on ad
hoc arbitration, it contains no provision authorizing Chinese courts to
assist parties in an ad hoc arbitration proceeding. Partly due to the civil
law tradition, Chinese courts usually interpret their authority narrowly
and are reluctant to take action absent explicit statutory authorization.47
As a result, an ad hoc arbitration seated in China would not be able to get
support from either the PRC Arbitration Law or a Chinese court regarding
important issues throughout the arbitration proceeding.48
For example, provided that the parties have failed to reach a specific
agreement on how to appoint the arbitrator(s), if one party wants to
obstruct arbitration it may simply refuse to appoint the arbitrator(s) or
cooperate with the other party regarding the appointment. If one party
does so, the arbitration proceeding will be at an impasse because no Chi-
nese court will assume jurisdiction over the case and assist the other party
in appointment of the arbitrator(s). Because of the ease with which a party
could obstruct the arbitration proceeding, successful operation of an ad
hoc arbitration in China could potentially be very difficult.49
Of course, the parties may choose a non-Chinese arbitration law as lex
arbitri in order to solve the problem, because most national arbitration
laws worldwide do allow ad hoc arbitration and do provide some gap-fill-
ing provisions to help the parties overcome problems in the arbitration pro-
ceeding. However, choosing a foreign lex arbitri itself is a highly complex
issue that may cause other potential risks and therefore is a rare choice for
parties in practice.50 Therefore, for this analysis, the author presumes that
the parties have made no such choice. If a Chinese court does enforce the
ad hoc arbitration agreement in this scenario, the results could be disas-
trous for the claimant if the defendant chooses to obstruct arbitration. On
the one hand, the court will not hear the case on its merits as the arbitra-
tion agreement between the parties has been enforced, while on the other
hand, the arbitration will likely end up in a deadlock, as discussed above.
46. For a more detailed analysis of possible outcomes of ad hoc arbitrations with
their seats in Chinese territory, see Zhang, supra note 25.
47. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 34-38 (3d ed.
2007); Key Features of Common Law or Civil Law Systems, WORLD BANK, http://ppp.world
bank.org/public-private-partnership/legislation-regulation/framework-assessment/legal-
systems/common-vs-civil-law (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
48. See Zhang, supra note 25.
49. Id.
50. See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TowARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 292 (1981); Peter Sherwin et al., The Deci-
sion to Arbitrate, PROSKAUER ON INT'L LITIG. & ARB., ch. 19, pt. V, § A, http://www.
proskauerguide.com/arbitration/19/V (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
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In scenario (c), however, because arbitration will take place outside of
China, where ad hoc arbitration is allowed, it would be validity-preferring
for Chinese courts to apply the seat law rather than the governing law of
the container contract (Chinese law).
Moreover, it is worth noting that applying Chinese law is mandatory
for some types of contracts that are to be performed within Chinese terri-
tory; these include, among others, Sino-foreign joint-venture contracts and
Sino-foreign joint-exploration of natural resources contracts.51 These con-
tracts concern areas where a vast quantity of business activities occur
between Chinese and foreign entities. If the parties to a contract of the
types mentioned above do not specifically agree on the law governing the
validity of the arbitration agreement, such arbitration agreements could be
invalidated if the law governing the container contract, i.e., Chinese law, is
interpreted as the law governing the validity of the arbitration agreement,
even when the parties have agreed to put the seat of arbitration outside
China. This result will obviously be against the parties' intent, as mani-
fested by their decision to place the seat of arbitration in a country under
the law of which ad hoc arbitration is allowed. As a result, taking into
consideration the above Chinese mandatory rule, it is also validity-prefer-
ring to apply the seat law instead of the governing law of the container
contract under such circumstances.
Based on the analysis above, if Chinese courts, as a general rule, apply
the seat law rather than the governing law of the container contract, the
courts will enforce ad hoc arbitration agreements more often than not. As
such, this rule remains validity-preferring and pro-arbitration because it
ensures that, once an ad hoc arbitration agreement is enforced, the dispute
will be sent to a jurisdiction where the ad hoc arbitration will be operable.
2. Complicated Issues Potentially Arising From the Choice-of-Law Rule
Despite being validity-preferring and pro-arbitration, the SPC's choice-
of-law rule is by no means perfect. Some complicated issues may poten-
tially arise pursuant to this rule.
a. Choosing a Non-Chinese Lex Arbitri Instead of Specifying a Non-
Chinese Law to Govern the Validity of the Arbitration Agreement
One of the issues that the SPC appears to have neglected is that when
concluding a contract, parties seldom specify the law governing the valid-
51. See Shewai Minshi Guanxi Falu Shiyong Fa ( [Law on
Application of Law in Foreign-related Civil Relations] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011), art. 4 (China);
Hetong Fa (4-iJA) [Contract Law] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15,
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 126, para. 2 (China); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu
Shenli Shewai Minshi Huo Shangshi Hetong Jiufen Anjian Fali Shiyong Ruogan Wenti
de Guiding
MA [Provi-
sions on Relevant Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Hearing Foreign-related
Civil and Commercial Contractual Disputes Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People's
Ct., July 23, 2007, effective Aug. 8, 2007), art. 8 (China).
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ity of the arbitration agreement; according to the SPC's rule, in order for
courts to rely on the law specified by the parties, the parties must explicitly
state that their chosen law governs the arbitration agreement's validity
rather than the substance of the container contract.52 Parties sometimes,
however, choose a law different from the seat law to govern the whole arbi-
tration, which is usually interpreted as a choice of lex arbitri." Of course,
such practice "is not to be recommended as it may lead to inextricable
complications,"54 but it is nonetheless a possibility. When parties do
choose a lex arbitri other than the seat law, the SPC's choice-of-law rule
may lead to problems of uncertainty.
Of course, as to an ad hoc arbitration agreement's validity, it would
not make any difference if both the lex arbitri chosen by the parties and
the seat law allow or disallow ad hoc arbitration. However, if parties,
instead of explicitly choosing a law governing the validity of the arbitration
agreement, choose a non-Chinese arbitration law as lex arbitri while put-
ting the seat of arbitration in China, the SPC's rule mandates that the seat
law (i.e., Chinese law) will determine the validity of the ad hoc arbitration
agreement.55 Accordingly, the ad hoc arbitration agreement will be nulli-
fied. Such a result, however, is clearly against the parties' will if the parties'
intention is interpreted as an attempt to validate the ad hoc arbitration
agreement by choosing a lex arbitri under which ad hoc arbitration is
allowed.
To the author's knowledge, the SPC has not yet decided a case with
facts similar to the hypothetical above, and thus this remains an open ques-
tion in practice. Nevertheless, if the SPC adheres to its validity-preferring
principle, it should validate the ad hoc arbitration agreement in such a
situation because doing so will be consistent with a more reasonable inter-
pretation of the parties' agreement: that their choice of a foreign lex arbitri
also means a choice of the lex arbitri country's law for determining the
validity of the arbitration agreement.
52. See Di'erci Quanguo Shewai Shangshi Haishi Shenpan Gongzuo Huiyi Jiyao
( [Minutes of the Second National Working
Conference on Adjudication of Foreign-related Commercial and Maritime Cases]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 26, 2005, effective Dec. 26, 2005), art. 58
(China).
53. See VARADY ET AL., supra note 29, at 683.
54. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 50, at 292.
55. See, e.g., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa" Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi
(fi AA RiY-fJ (oIi{ QA:AI ) Uiff) (Interpretation on
Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the "Arbitration Law of the People's
Republic of China"] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Aug. 23, 2006, effective Sept.
8, 2006), art. 16 (China) (stating that if the parties do not specify a law governing the
arbitration agreement, the court must then look to the law of the seat to determine the
agreement's validity).
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b. Specifying a Non-Chinese Law to Govern the Validity of the
Arbitration Agreement While Placing the Seat of Arbitration in
China
Another possible outcome of the SPC's rule is that it may, in effect,
cause a Chinese court to enforce an arbitration agreement calling for ad
hoc arbitration within Chinese territory. If parties specifically choose a
non-Chinese law, under which ad hoc arbitration is allowed, as the law
governing the validity of their ad hoc arbitration agreement, while placing
the seat of arbitration in China, a Chinese court will enforce such an arbi-
tration agreement because parties' specific choice takes priority over the
seat law under the SPC's rule. 56
For the successful operation of an ad hoc arbitration in China, how-
ever, an enforceable ad hoc arbitration agreement alone is far from suffi-
cient. Because neither the PRC Arbitration Law nor the SPC's
interpretation of the law contains provisions permitting Chinese courts to
assist in an ad hoc arbitration, parties cannot rely on Chinese courts for
any assistance with regards to certain procedural matters.57 As such, the
parties need to carefully design a complete mechanism to ensure the arbi-
tration's operation. In practice, this will surely be very difficult, albeit not
entirely impossible.58 In any case, at least in theory, ad hoc arbitration
with the seat in Chinese territory is permitted by the SPC's own rule.5 9
B. The SPC's Overly Strict Interpretation of the PRC Arbitration Law's
Requirement that Arbitration be Institutional
It is unfortunate that Chinese courts will invalidate ad hoc arbitration
agreements when the PRC Arbitration Law applies. This problem is com-
pounded when the SPC too strictly interprets and applies the PRC Arbitra-
tion Law.
1. When Parties Choose Institutional Rules Instead of Institutions
Themselves in Their Arbitration Agreement
In Ziublin International GmbH v. Wuxi Woco General Rubber Engineer-
ing Co. Ltd., a local Chinese court, following the SPC's instruction, struck
down an arbitration agreement that read, "ICC Rules, Shanghai shall
56. Id.
57. See generally Zhongcai Fa ([gg) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Stand-
ing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995) (China) (English
translation provided by the National People's Congress, available at http://www.npc.gov.
cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa" Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi
( M (iP I ) ) [Interpretation on
Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the "Arbitration Law of the People's
Republic of China"] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Aug. 23, 2006, effective Sept.
8, 2006) (China).
58. See Zhang, supra note 25.
59. See id.
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apply."60 In its reply letter regarding this case, the SPC instructed the
lower court to hold the arbitration agreement invalid. 61 First, the SPC
found that the parties did not specifically choose any law to govern the
validity of the arbitration agreement, but they did choose Shanghai as the
seat of arbitration. 62 Therefore, according to the SPC's choice-of-law rule,
the PRC Arbitration Law, as the seat law, applied. Second, the SPC rea-
soned that the parties only specified the arbitration rules to be applied, but
they did not explicitly appoint an arbitration institution. 63 Since no arbi-
tration institution was chosen, the arbitration agreement was held invalid
in accordance with the PRC Arbitration Law.64
The SPC's interpretation of the PRC Arbitration Law as discussed
above seems too rigid. The standard arbitration clause recommended by
the ICC International Court of Arbitration (ICC) reads: "[alll disputes aris-
ing out of or in connection with the present contract shall be finally settled
under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by
one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules" 6 5
Similar to the standard clause, the wording of the contract in Zublin ("ICC
Rules . . . apply") also refers to the ICC Rules. Thus, it is reasonable to
interpret this wording as the parties' intention to submit their dispute to
ICC arbitration. Because the ICC is undoubtedly an arbitration institution,
this should satisfy the PRC Arbitration Law's requirement for arbitration to
be institutional. Furthermore, the ICC Rules contain provisions stipulat-
ing that the ICC shall administer procedural matters such as communica-
tion, appointment and confirmation of arbitrators, and scrutiny of the
award, which unequivocally indicates that application of the ICC Rules
means that the ICC should administer the arbitration.66 At a minimum, it
is reasonable for the SPC to find that the parties' choice of the ICC Rules,
even without further specification, justifies a presumption that their inten-
60. Deguo Xupulin Guoji Youxian Zeren Gongsi yu Wuxi Woke Tongyong
Gongcheng Xiangjiao Youxian Gongsi Shenqing Queren Zhongcai Xieyi Xiaoli An
Jjg [Zublin Int'l GmbH v. Wuxi Woco Gen. Rubber Eng'g Co. Ltd.] (People's Ct. of
Wuxi High-tech Indus. Dev. Dist., Sept. 2, 2004) para. 2 (China).
61. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Deguo Xupulin Guoji Youxian Zeren Gongsi yu
Wuxi Woke Tongyong Gongcheng Xiangjiao Youxian Gongsi Shenqing Queren Zhongcai
Xieyi Xiaoli Yian de Qingshi de Fuhan
- [Reply Letter to the Request for Instructions
Concerning the Case in Which Zublin International GmbH and Wuxi Woco Gen. Engi-
neering Rubber Co. Ltd. Request for Determination of the Validity of the Arbitration





65. Standard ICC Arbitration Clauses, INT'L CHAMBER COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/
products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/standard-icc-arbitration-clauses/
(last visited Mar. 8, 2013) (emphasis added).
66. See generally Int'l Chamber of Commerce, ICC Rules of Arbitration (Jan. 1,1998)
[hereinafter 1998 ICC Rules of Arbitration], http://www.icc.se/skiljedom/rules-arb-
english.pdf.
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tion is to choose the ICC as the arbitration institution. Of course, an
exception would be if the parties specify clearly that their arbitration
should be ad hoc or governed by the ICC Rules but administered by an
institution other than the ICC. The SPC's simplistic reasoning that choos-
ing institutional rules does not mean choosing an arbitration institution is
not persuasive.
Probably as a result of the SPC's rigid interpretation of the PRC Arbi-
tration Law's institutional arbitration requirement, the ICC has adopted a
special standard clause for arbitration in mainland China, which reads:
All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall be
submitted to the International Court of Arbitration of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce and shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of
the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators
appointed in accordance with the said Rules.6 7
In 2006, two years after Ziublin, the SPC promulgated the Interpreta-
tion on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the "Arbitration Law
of the People's Republic of China" (SPC Arbitration Law Interpretation).
Article 4 of the SPC Arbitration Law Interpretation reads, "[w]here the arbi-
tration agreement only agrees on the applicable arbitration rules for the
dispute, it shall be deemed that no arbitration institution has been agreed,
except that the parties reach a supplementary agreement or the arbitration
institution could be ascertained according to the agreed arbitration rules."6 8
This language appears favorable for arbitration agreements similar to the
one in Ziublin.69 As discussed above, because of the administration and
supervisory roles that the ICC plays under the ICC Rules, there is no doubt
that the ICC is the institution to administer an arbitration under the
Rules. 70 As a result, it would be reasonable to hold that the ICC could be
ascertained as the arbitration institution according to the ICC Rules.
According to Article 4 of the SPC Arbitration Law Interpretation, therefore,
the arbitration agreement containing the language "ICC Rules apply"
should be deemed to have chosen the ICC as the arbitration institution,
and thus should be valid.
67. Standard ICC Arbitration Clauses- Adaptation of the Clauses to Particular Circum-
stances, INT'L CHAMBER COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitra-
tion-and-ADR/Arbitration/Standard-ICC-Arbitration-Clauses/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013)
(emphasis added).
68. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhong-
cai Fa" Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi
(H4A*i&M M ( RPF@iA) IMTANRM#) 11nterpretation on
Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the "Arbitration Law of the People's
Republic of China"] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Aug. 23, 2006, effective Sept.
8, 2006), art. 4 (China) (emphasis added).
69. Deguo Xupulin Guoji Youxian Zeren Gongsi yu Wuxi Woke Tongyong
Gongcheng Xiangjiao Youxian Gongsi Shenqing Queren Zhongcai Xieyi Xiaoli An
)j5) [Zublin Int'l GmbH v. Wuxi Woco Gen. Rubber Eng'g Co. Ltd.] (People's Ct. of
Wuxi High-tech Industry Development District, Sept. 2, 2004) (China).
70. See generally 1998 ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 66.
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As promising as the principle articulated in the SPC Arbitration Law
Interpretation may sound, unfortunately, in 2009 the SPC once again
instructed a local court to nullify an arbitration agreement that called for
arbitration under the ICC Rules. 7 ' In this case, the SPC focused on the fact
that the parties did not draft their arbitration agreement using the language
of the ICC's special standard clause for arbitration in mainland China.72
Based solely on the parties' failure to use this special clause, the SPC held
that no arbitration institution could be ascertained according to the ICC
Rules.73 As a result, the arbitration agreement was held invalid.74 Conse-
quently, it remains unclear what would qualify under the SPC's interpreta-
tion as a situation in which the arbitration institution could be ascertained
according to the parties' choice of applicable arbitration rules.
A possible example may be found in the Arbitration Rules of the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC).
Article 4.4 of the 2012 CIETAC Arbitration Rules reads, "[wihere the par-
ties agree to refer their dispute to arbitration under these Rules without
providing the name of the arbitration institution, they shall be deemed to
have agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration by CIETAC."75 This language
ensures that the arbitration institution can be ascertained according to the
agreed arbitration rules.
In international practice, it is common for the arbitration agreement to
refer to an arbitration institution's rules instead of the institution itself.76
This is apparent from the standard arbitration clauses drafted by various
arbitration institutions, including the ICC.7 7 These standard arbitration
clauses are accepted by most of the world's jurisdictions as valid arbitra-
tion agreements.78 Moreover, not all institutions' rules use the same clear
71. The arbitration clause in this case reads: "[A]ll disputes arising from this con-
tract shall be finally settled by arbitration according to 'ICC Arbitration Rules"' (author's
translation). See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Xiaxin Dianzi Gufen Youxian Gongsi
yu Bilishi Chanpin Youxian Gongsi Queren Jingxiao Xieyi Zhongcai Tiaokuan Xiaoli de
Qingshi de Fuhan
j @ [Reply Letter to the Request for Instructions Concerning Determi-
nation of the Validity of the Distribution Agreement's Arbitration Clause in the Case
Between Amoi Tech. Co., Ltd and Societe de Production Belge AG] (promulgated by the




75. 2012 China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitra-
tion Rules, art. 4.4, CIETAC (effective as of May 1, 2012) [hereinafter CIETAC Arbitra-
tion Rules], available at http://cn.cietac.org/rules/rules.pdf.
76. To conduct an institutional arbitration, parties "incorporate the rules of the
selected institution .. .by reference." In contrast, parties desiring ad hoc arbitration will
refer to rules designed for non-institutional arbitration, such as those developed by
UNCITRAL. ASHURST LLP, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CLAUSEs 2-3 (2011), available at
http://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx?idResource=4724.
77. See Standard ICC Arbitration Clauses, supra note 65.
78. For instance, in discussing the use of the ICC's standard arbitration clause, the
authors identify China as a notable exception to the general practice that an arbitration
agreement will be valid even if the standard clause refers only to the institution's rules.
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wording as CIETAC's rules with respect to ascertaining the administering
body.79 In light of the foregoing, the SPC's position that institutions can-
not be ascertained solely by an agreement's reference to the institution's
arbitration rules is contrary to the parties' intention, as well as interna-
tional practice. A more reasonable approach to Article 4 of the SPC Arbitra-
tion Law Interpretation would be that the arbitration agreement's validity
should depend on whether the arbitration rules the parties agreed upon
clearly refer to which arbitration institution would administer the arbitra-
tion. If the parties agree on rules like the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, in
which no arbitration institution is referred to as the body to administer the
arbitration,80 then a court could reasonably conclude that no arbitration
institution could be ascertained according to the agreed arbitration rules.
However, if such agreed rules clearly refer to an institution to administer
the arbitration, a Chinese court should recognize it as the ascertained
institution.
On this issue, the new 2012 ICC Rules look promising. Article 1 of
the new Rules states that, "[tihe [International] Court [of Arbitration of the
ICC] is the only body authorized to administer arbitrations under the
Rules . . . ."81 Although not as explicit as the wording in the CIETAC Rules,
this language strongly supports a holding that the ICC, as an arbitration
institution, could be ascertained according to its own Rules. However, it is
overly optimistic to conclude that the new language will aid the parties to
an arbitration agreement choosing the ICC Rules. The cases above seem to
suggest that the issue will not be clarified until the SPC decides to enforce
a similar arbitration agreement.
In any event, for arbitration agreements only choosing an institution's
rules instead of clearly stating an intention to submit the dispute to an
institution's administration, relevant wording in the chosen arbitration
rules play a pivotal role in the SPC's decision on whether such arbitration
agreements shall be held valid under the PRC Arbitration Law.
2. When Parties Choose Two Institutions in Their Arbitration Agreement
Parties sometimes choose two arbitration institutions and further
agree that any future dispute may be submitted to either one of them.
Courts usually allow such an arrangement and will generally give the
claimant the right to choose from one of the two agreed institutions.82
Chinese courts, however, do not permit the parties to implement such a
See YVES DERAINS & Euc A. SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 388
(2d ed. 2005).
79. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 75, art. 4.4.
80. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 8.
81. Int'l Chamber of Commerce, ICC Rules of Arbitration, art. 1(2) (Jan. 1, 2012)
[hereinafter 2012 ICC Rules of Arbitration], available at http://www.iccwbo.org/prod-
ucts-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/.
82. See Weixia Gu, The Changing Landscape of Arbitration Agreements in China: Has
the SPC-Led Pro-Arbitration Move Gone Far Enough?, 22 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1, 38 (2009);
Norbert Horn, The Arbitration Agreement in Light of Case Law of the UNCITRAL Model
Law (Arts 7 and 8), 5 INT'L ARB. L. REv. 146, 149 (2005).
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mechanism. According to the SPC Arbitration Law Interpretation, "[w]here
two or more arbitration institutions are agreed in an arbitration agreement,
the parties may agree to choose one of the arbitration institutions and
apply for arbitration; where the parties cannot reach an agreement on the
choice of arbitration institution, the arbitration agreement is invalid."83
Accordingly, a resisting party in such a situation may easily block arbitra-
tion by refusing to reach a supplementary agreement to eliminate one of
the two agreed institutions.
It is true that a choice of two institutions within one arbitration agree-
ment may cause some problems in practice, but logically such a choice
does not conflict with the PRC Arbitration Law's requirement that arbitra-
tion must be institutional. By choosing two acceptable institutions, parties
have clearly demonstrated their intent to arbitrate and their willingness to
have their arbitration administered by an institution, which satisfies the
law's institutional arbitration requirement. Additionally, any problems
caused by naming two institutions in one arbitration agreement may be
resolved by other mechanisms, such as giving the first claimant the right to
choose which institution will have jurisdiction. In any event, Chinese
courts do not need to blindly invalidate an arbitration agreement that
names two institutions. In fact, the SPC's negative attitude towards parties'
choice of two-or-more arbitration institutions has gone beyond the PRC
Arbitration Law's requirement that arbitration must be institutional." By
requiring that parties agree to eliminate one of the two institutions after a
dispute arises, the SPC has essentially redefined the law's requirement
from "an institution" to "only one institution." Such an interpretation is
clearly contrary to the SPC's other validity-preferring and pro-arbitration
approaches.
In summary, although ad hoc arbitration agreements are invalid under
the PRC Arbitration Law, the SPC has adopted a choice-of-law rule that will
validate an ad hoc arbitration agreement in most circumstances where
there is a possibility to apply a non-Chinese law. Overall, the SPC's choice-
of-law rule ensures that Chinese courts will enforce most arbitration agree-
ments calling for ad hoc arbitration outside China. For this reason, the
SPC approach can be seen as validity-preferring and pro-arbitration.
Despite such a validity-preferring choice-of-law rule, the SPC is not entirely
consistent with its pro-arbitration strategy in other contexts. For example,
83. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhong-
cai Fa" Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi
(R TE fi J (R A A IU{h) FlAJYif)') [interpretation on
Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the "Arbitration Law of the People's
Republic of China"] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Aug. 23, 2006, effective Sept.
8, 2006), art. 5 (China).
84. Nothing in the PRC Arbitration Law provides that parties must select only one
particular institution in their arbitration agreement. See generally Zhongcai Fa ({ MVA)
[Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31,
1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995) (China) (English translation provided by the National Peo-
ple's Congress, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/con
tent_1383756.htm).
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it is excessively strict when determining whether parties have properly
agreed to institutional arbitration when the agreement refers to an arbitra-
tion institution's rules rather than specifically choosing the institution
itself or when parties have agreed on two possible institutions to resolve
their dispute. The SPC needs to move towards a more coherent pro-arbitra-
tion stance in the future.
III. Reasons Behind Chinese Law's Apparent Hostility Towards Ad
Hoc Arbitration
The foregoing discussion shows that the PRC Arbitration Law's insti-
tutional arbitration requirement has created many complications for the
resolution of international commercial disputes in China or related to Chi-
nese parties. In light of these complications, it is important to ask why this
unique and strange requirement exists under Chinese law in the first place.
Obviously, this requirement does not in any general way encourage arbitra-
tion in China or with Chinese entities, and, in fact, it is hard to see how it
could reasonably benefit any entity or group. So, what is the rationale
behind the rule? What were legislators' concerns when the rule was put
into force?
A. Reasons Given By the Chinese Legislature
The Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (the NPC)8 5
gave two reasons why the PRC Arbitration Law only provides for institu-
tional arbitration:
In the course of drafting the PRC Arbitration Law, the issue of ad hoc arbi-
tration has been studied. The basic opinion was that ad hoc arbitration
would be allowed in international economic and trade disputes, but would
not be approved in domestic economic and trade disputes. There are two
main reasons why the PRC Arbitration Law does not provide for ad hoc arbi-
tration. First, in the history of the development of arbitration as a legal insti-
tution, ad hoc arbitration appeared before institutional arbitration. Ad hoc
arbitration is on the decline from the perspective of future development.
Second, China only has a short history of arbitration, during which there
has only been institutional arbitration, but no ad hoc arbitration.86
From any perspective, the two reasons offered by the Chinese legisla-
ture are rather insubstantial and far from persuasive. First, although it is
true that ad hoc arbitration precedes institutional arbitration in time, this
should not serve as a justification to abandon ad hoc arbitration. Further-
85. The NPC is the highest organ of state power in the PRC. The NPC and its perma-
nent body, the Standing Committee, exercise the legislative power of the PRC. See
XIANFA arts. 58-59 (1982) (China).
86. QUANGUO RENDA CHANGWEIHUI FAZHI GONGZUO WEYUANHUI
( g JI) [THE LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMM'N OF THE STANDING
COMM. OF THE NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. OF THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF CHINA], ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGCAi FALD SHIPING ( ) i [COMMEN-
TARIES ON ARBITRATION LAWS OF CHINA] 38 (1997).
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more, there is no indication that the use of ad hoc arbitration is declining.
Due to their distinctive characteristics, ad hoc and institutional arbitration
complement each other and coexist in the international commercial
field.8 7 Because contracting parties have distinct practical needs in differ-
ent disputes, each of the two types of arbitration has certain advantages
over the other that make it a better choice for resolving a particular dispute.
Indeed, in some fields such as admiralty and maritime law, ad hoc arbitra-
tion's flexibility and efficiency have made it the preferred method of dis-
pute resolution.88 Therefore, ad hoc arbitration and institutional
arbitration are both essential to a complete arbitration system in the sense
that each provides parties with a dispute resolution mechanism to fit their
distinct practical needs.
Second, it is not sensible to preclude ad hoc arbitration on the ground
that China only has a short history of arbitration and has never had a sys-
tem of ad hoc arbitration before. It is hard to see why China's short history
of arbitration can work as a justification for the exclusion of ad hoc arbitra-
tion under the PRC Arbitration Law, because the flexible and largely self-
sufficient nature of ad hoc arbitration may in fact make it easier to estab-
lish as a legal institution. Also, logically speaking, never having something
in the past should not justify refusing to have it in the future. As a result,
why China chooses to have institutional arbitration but not ad hoc arbitra-
tion cannot reasonably be explained by a short history or lack of
experience.
B. A Historical Analysis
Why did the Chinese legislature offer such unpersuasive reasons? The
author certainly finds it unlikely that the NPC was deliberately concealing
its real reasons for adopting such a policy. Instead, there might be some
reasons that the NPC did not explicitly express or maybe even did not
clearly realize itself. In order to discover the implicit reasons behind the
policy, a comparison between arbitration's history in the Western world
and that in China is necessary.89 This comparison intends to shed light on
some Chinese attitudes and ideas surrounding arbitration that might have
subconsciously influenced the policy-making process.
1. The History of Arbitration in the Western World
Arbitration obviously has a very long history in Western cultures,
which can be evidenced even in various myths and legends.90 It is doubt-
87. See discussion supra Part I.
88. See Soc'Y OF MAR. ARBITRATORS, INC., GUIDE TO MARITIME ARBITRATION IN NEw
YORl: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY-ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT ARBITRATION UNDER THE RULES OF
THE SOCIETY OF MARITIME ARBITRATORS, INC. Question 9 (1997), available at http://www.
smany.org/sma/maritimefaq.html.
89. For a much fuller discussion on the history of arbitration in both the western
world and China, see Tietie Zhang, Legal Transplant of Arbitration in China (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
90. See generally LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2:1 (3d
ed. 2003, rev. ed. 2012); FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS
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ful that the exact origins of arbitration will ever be known, but one can
naturally assume that it appeared when people had disputes and needed a
neutral resolution. As early as 1500 B.C., arbitration was already used in
ancient Egypt.9' Of course, "arbitration" at this stage was presumably very
primitive and different from what it is today. But as societies became more
complex, so did arbitration. It later became a common way of dispute reso-
lution in both Greece and Rome. 92 From Rome, arbitration was carried to
the whole of Europe.93 In many European countries during medieval
times, arbitration became well established in commercial and maritime
fields.94 As time went on, arbitration's advantages over litigation made it
increasingly favored by merchants, as they were able to avoid the intrica-
cies of different national court systems and have their disputes resolved
with maximum neutrality, efficiency, and commercial expertise.9 5
There was a period when courts were hostile towards arbitration in
general, 96 but over time arbitration's advantages in privately solving par-
ties' disputes, especially international commercial disputes, became mani-
fest. Arbitration achieved widespread respectability and legal recognition
in jurisdictions worldwide. In modern times, professional arbitration insti-
tutions were established to provide services to parties and arbitrators so as
to facilitate the dispute resolution process.97
Therefore, it can be said that arbitration in the Western world devel-
oped in a bottom-up way. Originating from parties' needs to have their
disputes resolved by a third party in an amicable way, arbitration evolved
to meet parties' desires to resolve their dispute outside a national court
system so as to enjoy maximum neutrality, flexibility, efficiency, and confi-
dentiality. Later, national laws and courts recognized and respected par-
ties' wishes and designed a system to support or facilitate the operation of
this private dispute resolution mechanism. Following this path, ad hoc
arbitration occurred first, from which institutional arbitration later
evolved.
2. The History of Arbitration in China
Arbitration's development in China is somewhat different. Despite
having origins as ancient as those in the West,98 arbitration in China had
AND ACHIEVEMENTS 3-8 (1948); William Catron Jones, History of Commercial Arbitration
in England and the United States: A Summary View, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION:
A ROAD TO WORLD-WIDE COOPERATION 127, 127 (Martin Domke ed., 1958).
91. See THoMAs OEHMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 17 (1987).
92. See EDMONSON, supra note 90, §§ 2:2-2:3.
93. See id. § 2:3.
94. See generally id. § 2:4.
95, See id. § 2:4.
96. See KELLOR, supra note 90, at 5-6; OEHMKE, supra note 91, at 19.
97. For example, the ICC International Court of Arbitration was established in
1923. For a brief introduction to its history and development, see Arbitration, INTL
CHAMBER COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbi-
tration/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
98. See Deng Ruiping (Y[igyl) & Sun Zhiyu (pJigg), Lun Guoji Shangshi Zhongcai
de Lishi Yanjin (itl i${P f j [Historical Progress of International Com-
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remained in its primitive form for an excessively long time, up until the
beginning of the twentieth century.99 This is largely due to the fact that
China, throughout its history and especially from 221 B.C. until at least
1840 A.D., had been an imperial state in which agriculture was empha-
sized and commerce was suppressed. 100 Because of such state policies,
economic activity was not vibrant; therefore, economic disputes were rela-
tively rare. As a result, arbitration did not have much room to develop. Any
disputes relating to property or economic interests were resolved by the
state. 101
In the wake of the Opium Wars' 0 2 of the mid-nineteenth century, rul-
ers of the Qing Dynasty 03 were forced to open China to the world and
allow Chinese parties to engage in commercial activities with business enti-
ties from foreign countries.104 In the meantime, also realizing its own
weakness and facing serious internal problems, the Qing government initi-
ated various reforms for the purpose of self-preservation. At the turn of
the century, promotion of commerce became an important initiative. 0 5 As
commercial activity boomed, the number of commercial disputes also
increased. It turned out, however, that the state bodies were incompetent
in resolving commercial disputes, both due to lack of experience hearing
such cases and also because there were no available procedural rules or
substantive laws in place.106 Attempting to solve the problem, the Qing
mercial Arbitration], 6 JINAN XUEBAO (ZHEXUE SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)
() [JOURNAL OF JINAN UNIVERSITY (PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCI-
ENCES)] 92, 93 (2009) (China).
99. See id. at 94.
100. See id.
101. In imperial China, there was no separation of powers. As a result, there were no
separate courts. The functions of courts were carried out by executive officials. See
ESTHER LAM, CHINA AND THE WTO: A LONG MARCH TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 13 (2009);
Hayden Windrow, A Short History of Law, Norms, and Social Control in Imperial China, 7
ASIAN-PAC. L. & PoL'Y J. 244, 246 (2006) (referring to the absence of a separation of
powers tradition).
102. Wars between China and the British Empire after China sought to restrict illegal
British opium trafficking, which consisted of the First Opium War (1839-1842) and the
Second Opium War (1856-1860). Opium Wars, ENCLYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www
.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/430163/Opium-Wars (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
103. The last ruling imperial dynasty of China (1644-1911/12), also known as the
Manchu Dynasty. Qing Dynasty, ENCLYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/112846/Qing-dynasty (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
104. See, e.g., Opium Wars, supra note 102; Wolfgang Keller et al., Shanghai's Trade,
China's Growth: Continuity, Recovery, and Change Since the Opium War 6 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17754, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org.
proxy.library.comell.edu/papers/wl7754.pdfnewwindow-1.
105. See Ren Yunlan (RI), Lun Jindai Zhongguo Shanghui de Shangshi Zhongcai
Gongneng (tif{ { [Chambers of Commerce's Function of Com-
mercial Arbitration in Modern China], 4 ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHI YANJIU (95 Q 3ffl
[CHINESE EcON. HIST. RES.] 117, 117 (1995) (China).
106. See Ren, supra note 105, at 117; Zheng Chenglin (#[Jf4), Jindai Zhongguo
Shangshi Zhongcai Zhidu Yanbian de Lishi Guiji (
IThe Historical Track of the Evolution of the Commercial Arbitration System in Modern
China], 6 ZHONGZHOU XUEKAN (+flfjtTJ) [ACAD. J. ZHONGZHOU] 122, 123-25 (2002)
(China).
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government encouraged the establishment of chambers of commerce
across China and endowed these private organizations with the power to
"arbitrate" commercial cases-this is considered the beginning of China's
arbitration system.107
A similar system was kept in place by the Republic of China after the
rulers of the Qing Dynasty were overthrown in 1911.108 At that time,
chambers of commerce created divisions of commercial arbitration as sub-
sidiary organizations where commercial cases would be "arbitrated."l 0 9
Unfortunately, however, due to the unstable social conditions wrought by
continuous war during the Republic of China era, although a fair number
of cases were resolved by way of arbitration, arbitration as a legal institu-
tion remained largely underdeveloped.110
After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the
entirety of "old" China's legal system, including the arbitration system, was
abolished. From 1957 on, China adopted a highly centralized planned
economy system."1 Under this system, business entities no longer made
independent decisions regarding their own business operations. Instead,
they only needed to follow the government's orders to produce, supply,
purchase, or sell. Under such circumstances, disputes between business
entities became rare. When disputes did arise, they would be dealt with by
administrative bodies of the government rather than through arbitration or
litigation.11 2 Arbitration in China during this historical period was limited
to foreign-related economic disputes, namely commercial disputes between
Chinese parties and foreign parties." 3 To resolve disputes that might arise
in foreign trade and in contractual relationships between foreign and Chi-
nese business entities, the Chinese central government established two for-
eign-related arbitration institutions under the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade: the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commis-
sion and the Maritime Arbitration Commission.'"'
107. See Ren, supra note 105, at 117; Zheng, supra note 106, at 123.
108. See JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA 1 (2d ed. 2008); Qing
Dynasty, supra note 103,
109. Ren, supra note 105, at 119; Zheng supra note 106, at 123.
110. See Ren, supra note 105, at 119; Zheng supra note 106, at 124.
111. For an overview of the planned economy and its impact on various economic
sectors, see Rumy Hasan, Reflections on the Impact Upon China's Polity From the Retreat of
State Capitalism, 34 CRITICAL Soc. 575 (2008).
112. See Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 245, 250
(1991); Vai lo Lo, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in China, MD. SERIES IN CONTEMP.
ASIAN STUD., nO. 5, 2001 at 1, 4, available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1165&context=mscas.
113. See TAO, supra note 108, at 8-9.
114. See Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu Zhengwuyuan Guanyu Zai Zhongguo Guoji
Maoyi Cujin Weiyuanhui Nei Sheli Duiwai Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui de jueding
g [Decision to Establish Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission Within the China
Council for the Promotion of International Trade] (promulgated by the Government
Administration Council of the Cent. People's Gov't, May 6, 1954, effective May 6, 1954),
art. 1 (China); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Guanyu Zai Zhongguo Guoji
Maoyi Cujin Weiyuanhui Nei Sheli Haishi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui de Jueding
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Yet, starting in the late 1970s, China began to adopt a "reform and
opening-up policy."115 The highly centralized planned economy was grad-
ually dismantled, and a transition toward a market economy began. 16
With this policy in place, commercial activities once again became vibrant.
As in the late Qing Dynasty, the changing economic circumstances called
for a new dispute resolution mechanism. In the early 1980s, besides
undertaking numerous reforms in the judicial system, the Chinese govern-
ment established an arbitration system under which domestic commercial
disputes might be resolved. 117 Yet, following customs and ways of thinking
inherited from the old planned economy era, administrative bodies of the
government continued to be the authority under this arbitration system.' 1 3
Various laws and regulations endowed certain government offices with the
power to "arbitrate" disputes.' 19 In addition, these laws established, as
subsidiaries of government bodies, some "arbitration institutions" to hear
[Decision to Establish Maritime Arbitration Commission Within the China Council for
the Promotion of International Trade] (promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 21, 1958,
effective Nov. 21, 1958), art. 1 (China). The two institutions were later respectively
renamed China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC)
and China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC). See Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiang
Duiwai Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Gaicheng Wei Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai
Weiyuanhui de Tongzhi
~ [Notice to
Rename Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission as Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitra-
tion Commission] (promulgated by the St. Council, Feb. 26, 1980, effective Feb. 26,
1980) (China); Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiang Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui
Gaiming Wei Zhongguo Guoji Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui he Xiuding Zhongcai Guize
de Pifu
VYllyVflfg [Approval and Reply on Renaming Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitra-
tion Commission as China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
and Amending the Arbitration Rules] (promulgated by the St. Council, June 21, 1988,
effective June 21, 1988) (China); Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiang Haishi Zhongcai
Weiyuanhui Gaiming Wei Zhongguo Haishi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui he Xiuding Zhongcai
Guize de Pifu
[Approval and Reply on Renaming Maritime Arbitration Commission as China Maritime
Arbitration Commission and Amending the Arbitration Rules] (promulgated by the St.
Council, June 21, 1988, effective June 21, 1988) (China).
115. See Lo, supra note 112, at 2-3.
116. See THE LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMM'N OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT'L PEO-
PLE'S CONG. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 86, at 1-2; Hasan, supra note
111, at 579.
117. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGCAI FA QUANSHU
() [PANDECTS OF ARBITRATION LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA] 9-10 (Quanguo Renda Changweihui Fazhi Gongzuo Weiyuanhui Minfa Shi
( [Civil Law Office of the Legislative Affairs
Comm'n of the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong.] & Zhongguo Guoji Jingji
Maoyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Mishu Ju ( {# Z,0-)) [Secreta-
riat of China Int'l Econ. & Trade Arbitration Comm'n] eds, 1995).
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., Jingji Hetong Fa (ig-6-].) [Economic Contract Law] (promulgated
by the Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 13, 1981, effective July 1, 1982), art. 48 (China).
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commercial disputes.120
Such institutions, however, were not arbitration institutions in the
modern sense. Indeed, the government explicitly stated that these institu-
tions were "different from arbitration institutions in capitalist coun-
tries,"'21 because they were "executing the authority to arbitrate on behalf
the country"122 and their "awards represent[ed] the country's will."12 3 In
fact, the "arbitration" system at this stage lacked many salient features of
arbitration as practiced today. For example, the "arbitration award" was
not final because any unsatisfied party had the option to file the case in
court after receiving the award.' 24 Realizing the problems these features
created as China became more integrated in the global economy, the NPC
promulgated the current Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China in
1994 in an attempt to bring China's arbitration system closer to modern
principles and practices.' 25
As a result, it can be said that arbitration in China developed in a top-
down way. In both the early twentieth century and early 1980s, the Chi-
nese government tried to promote commerce in order to develop the Chi-
nese economy. Then, to fit the changing economy's practical needs, the
Chinese government established arbitration institutions so that business
entities might have their commercial disputes resolved. In both of these
periods, only institutional arbitration was established, never ad hoc
arbitration.
3. What the Comparison Tells Us
The forgoing discussion shows that arbitration has followed a differ-
ent developmental path in China as compared to the one in the Western
world. In the West, arbitration as a legal institution developed in a bottom-
up pattern. It originated in the form of ad hoc arbitration, as that method
best suited merchants' needs for a neutral third party, other than a court,
to make a quick and just decision.126 Institutional arbitration appeared
much later and aimed to provide professional services to parties and arbi-
120. See, e.g., Jingji Hetong Zhongcai Tiaoli ( JP8) [Regulation on Eco-
nomic Contract Arbitration] (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 22, 1983, effective
Aug. 22, 1983), art. 2 (China).
121. Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng GuanliJuJingji Hetong Si Guanyu Guanche Zhix-
ing "Jingji Hetong Zhongcai Tiaoli" de Jidian Yijian(Ifl ({~ - fVMD, AI, ) f Sev-
eral Opinions on Implementing "Regulation on Economic Contract Arbitration"]
(promulgated by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, Office of Eco-
nomic Contracts, Nov. 3, 1983, effective Nov. 3, 1983), art. 2 (China).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Jingji Hetong Fa (iggg $) [Economic Contract Law] (promulgated by
the Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 13, 1981, effective July 1, 1982), art. 49 (China); Jingji
Hetong Zhongcai Tiaoli (t10 . { + iA) [Regulation on Economic Contract Arbitra-
tion] (promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 22, 1983, effective Aug. 22, 1983), art. 33
(China).
125. THE LEGISLATIVE AFFAiRS COMM'N OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT'L PEOPLE'S
CONG. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 86, at 4-5.
126. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
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trators as commercial disputes became much more frequent.' 27 In China,
however, development of arbitration followed a top-down pattern. Largely
due to the prolonged underdevelopment of commercial activities, in China
there never existed a practical need for arbitration until drastic social and
economic reforms arose at the beginning of the twentieth century as well as
in the late 1970s.128 When arbitration was finally established as a legal
institution, ad hoc arbitration was never adopted in the system.
It appears from this comparison that, unlike the "natural" growth pat-
tern in the West, the Chinese arbitration system has been largely "govern-
ment-made." When Chinese policy makers decided to take on reforms and
set up an arbitration system, they probably did not feel obliged to follow
arbitration's classic model, which indisputably includes ad hoc arbitration.
Instead, one can assume they simply wanted something that best fit the
needs of the time, i.e., a dispute resolution mechanism that was urgently
needed to resolve commercial disputes in an environment of rapidly
increasing commercial activities. For this purpose, the Chinese govern-
ment would probably satisfy those needs by instituting a curtailed arbitra-
tion system containing only institutional arbitration, which could be
efficiently organized, provide standard and uniform practices, and operate
in a user-friendly manner for parties and legal practitioners who had never
participated in, or even heard of, arbitration before. In this sense, the Chi-
nese government probably had no interest in ad hoc arbitration at all.
4. Particular Social Background to the Current PRC Arbitration Law at Its
Time of Enactment
In order to better understand the rationale behind the PRC Arbitration
Law's strict requirement that arbitration must be institutional, one needs to
appreciate the Chinese political, social, and economic context at the time
the law was enacted. As described earlier, China instituted a planned econ-
omy system until 1978, when a shift towards a market economy began.1 29
This transition, which is by no means an easy task and is still in progress
even today, has had such a profound influence on China's society that it
cannot be neglected in the study of China's legal system, including the arbi-
tration system.
As noted earlier, in a planned economy economic activity is strictly
controlled by the government.13 0 Dispute settlement processes are no
exception.131 In contrast, this is exactly what arbitration, especially ad
hoc arbitration, tries to avoid. One of the main reasons for business enti-
ties choosing ad hoc arbitration is to avoid government control as much as
127. Id.
128. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
129. THE LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMM'N OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT'L PEOPLE'S
CONG. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note 86, at 1-2.
130. See Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It? Legal Institutions and Eco-
nomic Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 1, 5 (1991).
131. See Clarke, supra note 112, at 250-51.
390 Vol. 46
2013 China's Incomplete Ad Hoc Arbitration System
possible and to resolve their disputes in a private manner.132 Further-
more, the very nature of ad hoc arbitration, namely its flexibility and effi-
ciency, makes it extremely difficult to closely govern or control.' 33 From
the perspective of government control, therefore, a planned economy and
ad hoc arbitration are naturally at odds.
The transition from a planned economy to a market economy is a jour-
ney from one extreme to another. At first, the Chinese government was
rather cautious with reforms, as officials preferred small and steady pro-
gress to massive and drastic changes.134 In fact, the concept of arbitration
itself was so new in China when the PRC Arbitration Law was enacted that,
in one NPC official's mind, the law itself represented the "spirit of
reform."' 35 As an example, for the PRC Arbitration Law to establish that
arbitration commissions are independent of and not subordinate to any
administrative authorities was an extremely decentralized move at that
time.136 In this context, it is understandable that the Chinese legislature
wanted to implement the reform slowly. A slower transition could allow
the government enough time to gradually loosen its control over private
business entities, and private business entities would develop experience
and expertise with the new system in the interim. As compared with ad
hoc arbitration, institutional arbitration undoubtedly serves this purpose
better. It is much easier for the government to exercise some measure of
control over the institutions, which, in turn, may exercise some measure of
control over the arbitration cases. As a result, from the government's
standpoint, it was much more acceptable to start the reform with institu-
tional arbitration first, as a trial, before deciding whether to develop an ad
hoc arbitration system as well.
Hence, when enacting the PRC Arbitration Law in 1994, the Chinese
legislature did not necessarily intend to implement a flawless arbitration
system. Instead, the legislators were only trying to establish a transitional,
and admittedly imperfect, arbitration system that better fit the then-
existing social and economic background.
There have been encouraging signs that the Chinese government's
view towards ad hoc arbitration may become more lenient. An NPC official
has proposed that issues relating to ad hoc arbitration could be further
studied in practice, and the PRC Arbitration law could be perfected "after
common ground has been reached."' 37 The author earnestly hopes this
132. The development of arbitration in the western world evidences parties' desires to
resolve disputes swiftly and equitably, drawing on the commercial expertise of guilds
and other business entities without the involvement of courts. See discussion supra Part
1IlB,1.
133. Wei-Jen Chen, Separate but Equal in Arbitration? -An Analysis on Ad Hoc Arbitra-
tion of Taiwan and East Asia, 5 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 107, 120-21 (2012).
134. Osman Suliman, Reform and Macroeconomic Stability in China: An Overview, in
CHINA'S TRANSITION TO A SOCIALIST MARKET EcONoMY 23, 24 (Osman Suliman ed., 1998).
135. Hu Kangsheng, Zhongcai de Benzhi Shi Minjian Xing (fl ) [The
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promising amity toward ad hoc arbitration becomes widely accepted, so
that ad hoc arbitration will gain complete legitimacy under Chinese law.
IV. Reflections on and Suggestions for Chinese Arbitration Law
A. Chinese Law Should Not Use the Distinction Between Ad Hoc and
Institutional Arbitration as a Standard to Determine Arbitration
Agreements' Validity
From a pragmatic standpoint, it may be unwise to base an arbitration
agreement's validity on the distinction between ad hoc and institutional
arbitration. Because the dividing line between these two types of arbitra-
tion is not always clear, sole reliance on this distinction may lead to com-
plexity and uncertainty in practice.
1. The Distinction Between Ad Hoc and Institutional Arbitration May Be
Vague in Some Cases
According to the definition given earlier in this Article,138 the standard
used to distinguish ad hoc arbitration from institutional arbitration is
whether a professional institution is involved in the process of arbitration.
Upon closer examination, however, the issue may be more complicated.
The complication primarily results from arbitration institutions' dif-
ferent structures, working styles, and functions in arbitration proceedings.
Some institutions, such as the ICC and CIETAC, adopt relatively "intrusive"
approaches when administering arbitrations. These institutions tend to
supervise arbitration proceedings more closely. For example, both the ICC
and CIETAC provide frequent advice to tribunals on procedural matters
and scrutinize draft awards before the tribunal renders a final decision.139
Additionally, CIETAC affixes its official seal to the awards to indicate its
authority.140 These features make it fairly clear that arbitrations adminis-
tered by such organizations are undoubtedly institutional.
There are, however, other institutions that do not administer arbitra-
tion proceedings in the ways that the ICC and CIETAC do. Instead, they
work as organizing bodies providing services to arbitrators and parties to
facilitate arbitrations that in every other respect would be considered ad
hoc. Institutions of this kind may provide services such as appointing arbi-
trators and providing a venue for hearings, but they basically leave arbitra-
tion proceedings to the tribunals themselves.141 Usually, awards are not
issued under the institutions' names, either. The London Maritime Arbitra-
tors Association (LMAA) offers a typical example of such an institution.
138. See supra Part I, para. 2.
139. See generally 2012 ICC Rules of Arbitration, supra note 81; CIETAC Arbitration
Rules, supra note 75.
140. CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 75, art. 47.4.
141. "Unlike the ICC, the AAA and CPR do not closely supervise their arbitrations."
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On its official website, the LMAA describes itself as ". . . not adminis-
ter[ing] or supervis[ing] the conduct of arbitrations (unlike, for example,
the Chambre Arbitrale Maritime in Paris, or the ICC International Court of
Arbitration): the arbitrations [the LMAA's] members conduct remain ad
hoc and are administered by the tribunals involved."14 2 In light of this
structure, it may be incorrect to classify arbitration under the LMAA as
institutional even though an institution is technically involved.
Further, it is possible that other institutions could operate somewhere
between the two extremes represented by the ICC and CIETAC at one end
and the LMAA at the other. The foregoing discussion demonstrates the
difficulty of clearly classifying arbitrations conducted by such institutions
according to the dichotomy of ad hoc and institutional arbitration.
2. This Vagueness Will Likely Lead to Uncertain Results Under Chinese
Law
Although the sometimes vague distinction between ad hoc and institu-
tional arbitration usually does not bear any legal significance, as discussed
earlier, such a delicate difference may pose difficult legal issues under the
PRC Arbitration Law. For example, according to Li Jianqiang, before the
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) changed its arbitra-
tion rules in 2005, that institution's arbitrations were essentially ad hoc.14 3
Indeed, the awards, when rendered, only needed to be signed by the arbi-
trator(s); the HKIAC would not ordinarily affix its own seal to the
awards.' 44 However, if the parties so wished, the institution might affix its
seal to the award as proof that the arbitration award was rendered by arbi-
trator(s) appointed by the HKIAC.14 5
In this scenario, one might expect that an award affixed with the
HKIAC's seal might give rise to some controversy before a Chinese court.
On the one hand, it could be claimed that such an award is still ad hoc,
since the mere fact that an arbitration is conducted by arbitrator(s)
appointed by an institution does not necessarily make it institutional. On
the other hand, it could also be argued that such an award should be
treated as issued by an arbitration institution because an institution was
involved in the process of arbitration. Particularly in China, where all arbi-
tration institutions are heavily involved in arbitration proceedings, like the
ICC and CIETAC, it would not be surprising if courts customarily presume
142. What is the LMAA and What Does it Do?, LONDON MAR. ARB. Assoc., http://www.
Imaa.org.uk/faq.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2013).
143. Li Jianqiang ( Xianggang Zhongcai Jigou de Linshi Zhongcai ji Qi Qishi
( [Ad Hoc Arbitrations at Hong Kong Arbitration Insti-
tutions and Their Indications], 3 BEJING ZHONGCAI (dig { g) IARB. IN BEIJING] 82, 85, 93
(2006).
144. This can be different today. Article 30.5 of the current Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre Administered Arbitration Rules reads, "[a]n award shall be affixed with
the seal of the HKIAC." See Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre Administered
Arbitration Rules, art. 30.5, available at http://www.hkiac.org/images/stories/arbitra-
tion/AA%20Rules.pdf.
145. Li, supra note 143, at 85.
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that an arbitration is institutional as long as an institution's name appears
on the award.
This analysis, however, may not always be relevant under Chinese law.
On the one hand, arbitration awards seated outside China will be enforced
by Chinese courts according to the New York Convention, regardless of
whether they are ad hoc or institutional. 146 On the other hand, Chinese
arbitration institutions are all of the intrusive type and no ad hoc arbitra-
tion is allowed under the PRC Arbitration Law, so all arbitrations seated in
China and administered by Chinese arbitration institutions are indeed
institutional.
If, however, parties place the seat of their arbitration in China while
adopting the rules of a non-Chinese arbitration institution that takes a rela-
tively hands-off approach, such as those of the LMAA, it remains unde-
cided whether Chinese courts will treat this arbitration as ad hoc or
institutional. The author has not yet found any case on point, but courts
will likely have a large degree of discretion on this issue. Although a Chi-
nese court may hold that the arbitration is non-domestic and that the PRC
Arbitration Law therefore does not apply, if a court holds otherwise, the
SPC will likely need to give direction on how to resolve the difficult issues
presented by such a case.
As shown above, the distinction between ad hoc and institutional arbi-
tration is sometimes vague and the difficulty in clearly defining this dis-
tinction may add considerable complexity and uncertainty to the
determination of an arbitration agreement's validity. For that reason alone,
such a distinction is counterproductive. As a result, the distinction
between ad hoc and institutional arbitration should not be a proper ground
on which to base the validity of an arbitration agreement. Thus, because
the concept of institutional arbitration as such is not always clearly
defined, the PRC Arbitration Law should not require that arbitration be
institutional.
B. Historical Reasons for the Preclusion of Ad Hoc Arbitration in China
No Longer Exist
As previously discussed, the real reasons why China refused to have
ad hoc arbitration in the PRC Arbitration Law were essentially all related to
China's historical, social, economic, and political context, particularly at
the time of the law's promulgation in 1994.147 Today, however, most, if
not all, of these reasons are no longer relevant.
First, the planned economy has basically been dismantled.14 8 Today,
the Chinese government no longer plans all of the nation's economic
146. For enforcement of ad hoc arbitration agreements, see supra Part II; for enforce-
ment of ad hoc arbitration awards, see Zhang, supra note 25 (forthcoming).
147. See discussion supra Part 11I.B.3.
148. See XiANFA art. 15 (1982) (China). (stating that China practices a socialist market
economy); Albert H.Y. Chen, The Developing Theory of Law and Market Economy in Con-
temporary China, in LEGAl DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA: MARKET ECONOMY & LAw 3, 3-5
(Wang Guiguo & Wei Zhenying eds., 1996).
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affairs, and Chinese business entities do not receive directions on how to
run their business operations. Instead, China is home to a growing, if
imperfect, market economy.149
Second, government centralization is declining.15 0 The Chinese gov-
ernment no longer controls every aspect of society as it used to. Especially
in the context of commercial activities, Chinese laws respect party auton-
omy as a principle.151 For dispute resolution mechanisms, parties are free
to choose negotiation, mediation, (institutional) arbitration, or litiga-
tion.152 As such, the government does not become directly involved unless
the parties so intend.
Third, it stands to reason that since 1994 Chinese business entities
and legal practitioners have gained sufficient experience with arbitration.
Arbitration is no longer a novel dispute resolution mechanism. Moreover, a
large number of professional lawyers are helping their clients resolve com-
mercial disputes. China now has many lawyers and arbitrators with exten-
sive experience in arbitration.' 53
C. China Needs Ad Hoc Arbitration
As discussed above, China should not maintain the distinction
between ad hoc and institutional arbitration as a legal standard to deter-
mine the validity of an arbitration agreement. The historical analysis dem-
onstrates that the current PRC Arbitration Law represents a tentative or
interim legal framework that came into existence during the transition
period from a planned to market economy. Because China's social context
has radically changed and the major reasons for China's preclusion of ad
hoc arbitration have disappeared, there exists no compelling argument
against the full recognition of ad hoc arbitration in China's legal system if
the country continues moving towards a market economy, remains active
in the globalization process, and becomes more involved in the world's
international commercial arbitration system.15 4
149. See id.
150. BIN LIANG, THE CHANGING CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, 1978-PRESENT: CENTRALIZATION
OF POWER AND RATIONALIZATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM 70 (2008),
151. See, e.g., BING LIANG, CONTRACT LAW IN CHINA 40-41 (2002) (stating that the
PRC Contract Law adopts freedom of contract as a basic principle).
152. See, e.g., Lo, supra note 112, at 1.
153. See generally China Lawyer's Role in Domestic Arbitration and International Arbi-
tration, CHINA LAW. BLOG (Mar. 4, 2012, 2:04 PM), http://www.chinalawblog.org/law-
topics/legal-counsel/148-china-lawyers-role-in-domestic-arbitration-and-international-
arbitration.
154. Complete legitimization of ad hoc arbitration in China has been discussed and
supported by many Chinese scholars, despite some different opinions. See, e.g., Wang
Yan (T;') & Song Lianbin ( Shilun Linshi Zhongcai ji Qi Zai Woguo de
Xianzhuang (ititiila{ j [Ad Hoc Arbitration and Its Current Status
in China], 1 BEIJING ZHONGCAI (JLig{ ) [ARB. BEIJING] 1 (2005); Chen Fang (lgy),
Woguo Chengren Linshi Zhongcai de Yingran Xing Fenxi
( i 1{ g Jigg) [Analysis on Why China Should Recognize Ad Hoc Arbi-
tration], 4 LILUN GUANCHA (I) ) [THEORETIC OBSERVATION] 128 (2006); Huang
Shan ('illl), Woguo Jianli Linshi Zhongcai Zhidu de Sikao
(ffI3Jif 11 { g1Jg 1f [On the Establishment of China's Adhockery [sic] Arbitra-
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On the contrary, there are a number of reasons why China should
adopt a complete ad hoc arbitration system. On a larger scale, having a
good arbitration system may contribute to a country's economic develop-
ment.'55 Foreign investors and merchants are generally concerned about
how future disputes will be resolved when making international invest-
ments or conducting international transactions.' 5 6 In order for foreign
parties to be assured that their rights and interests will be protected, an
efficient and just dispute resolution mechanism is essential.157 Because
arbitration serves as the dominant dispute resolution mechanism for inter-
national commercial disputes,' 58 having a complete, efficient, and effective
arbitration system may help attract foreign investments and transactions.
By limiting the scope of ad hoc arbitration, the current Chinese arbitration
system surely has, at least to some extent, deterrent effects for foreign busi-
ness entities.' 59 As a result, adopting a complete ad hoc arbitration system
will help attract foreign business as much as possible and will thus benefit
China's further economic development.
When designing a good arbitration system, it is hard to see why ad hoc
arbitration should not be part of it. The consensual nature of arbitration is
most consistent with allowing the parties to decide what kind of arbitra-
tion procedure they want. Because of its obvious advantages, there will
always be parties who want to choose ad hoc arbitration. Therefore, a com-
plete and efficient arbitration system should allow parties to choose ad hoc
arbitration when it best fits their needs, especially if there is no reasonable
tion System], 12 HA'ERBIN XUEYUAN XUEBAO (Ug.) [. HARBIN U.] 52 (2006);
Hao Haiqing (gg ), Zai Woguo Jianli Linshi Zhongcai Zhidu de Falu Sikao
, )[Legal Thinking on Establishing an Ad Hoc Arbi-
tration System in China], 2 ZHONGGUO HAIYANG DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)
( %() [J. OCEAN UNIV. CHINA (Soc. Sci.)] 95 (2003) (for opin-
ions supporting such legitimization). But see, e.g., Liu Maoliang (fijaA), Linshi Zhong-
cai Yingdang Huanxing (igaff ' & ff) [Ad Hoc Arbitration Should Be on Hold], 1
(J${q#) BEUING ZHONGCAI [ARB. BEIJING] 8 (2005); Ye Xiaochun (VItHA ), Lun Zhong-
guo Dui Linshi Zhongcai Zhidu Yingyou de Lixing yu Taidu
(it P Xiltaff48{11 1911 EI~ ) [China's Proper Rationality and Attitude
Towards Ad Hoc Arbitration System], 5 YUNNAN CAIMAO XUEYUAN XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUE
BAN) )) [j. YUNNAN FIN. & ECON. U.] 116 (2006); Gong
Xiaoning ( Qianxi Linshi Zhongcai Zhidu Zai Woguo de Goujian
( [Analysis on the Construction of an Ad Hoc Arbitration
System in China], 30 FAZHI YU SHEHUI (Ai]4±) [LEGAL Sys. & Soc'v] 53 (2008) (for
opinions against such legitimization).
155. See generally, Eric A. Schwartz, The Role of International Arbitration in Economic
Development, 12 INT'L TRADE & Bus. L. REv. 127 (2009).
156. See id. at 127-28.
157. See id. at 128.
158. See BOHRING-UHLE, KIRCHHOFF, SCHERER, supra note 1, at 27; Aksen, Arbitration,
supra note 1, at 287-88.
159. At the very least, the PRC Arbitration Law has prompted numerous international
law firms to write guides to advise their clients on the potential pitfalls of arbitration in
China. While undoubtedly impossible to calculate the added cost of these undertak-
ings, one can reasonably assume that such efforts have consumed significant energy and
resources solely because of China's unusual position against ad hoc arbitration. See
generally, e.g., CHINESE ARBITRATION: A SELECTION OF PITFALLS (Ass'n for Int'l Arbitration
ed. 2009); Sherwin et al., supra note 50; Tao, supra note 108.
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policy reason for precluding that option. Moreover, in the field of interna-
tional commercial arbitration, the world is closely connected. A national
law's special or bizarre provisions and practices, like the preclusion of ad
hoc arbitration under Chinese law, may create complex scenarios and pro-
duce unexpected outcomes through its dissonance with the international
system. In order to have a stable and efficient arbitration system, China
needs to bring its law into line with international practice so that China
may integrate more fully into the international commercial arbitration
system.
Last but not least, if China fully endorses ad hoc arbitration, espe-
cially by allowing ad hoc arbitration seated in China, one can naturally
assume this will bring more business for Chinese arbitration practitioners
and those in related industries. Such business opportunities will certainly
be beneficial for China's economic growth.
D. How Should China Construct a Complete Ad Hoc Arbitration
System?
The next question for China is how to fit ad hoc arbitration into its
current legal framework. Unsurprisingly, the first step should be to elimi-
nate the requirement that parties must appoint an arbitration institution in
their arbitration agreement. An arbitration agreement should be valid irre-
spective of whether parties agree to submit their dispute to an arbitration
institution or an ad hoc tribunal. Completely legitimizing ad hoc arbitra-
tion under Chinese law, however, involves more than simply getting rid of
this requirement.
The second step would be to provide support mechanisms for ad hoc
arbitration in the law. Issues that need to be addressed include, among
others, who will be the appointing authority absent parties' specific agree-
ment, who will have authority to decide challenges of arbitrators, and what
provisional measures are available. Moreover, the Chinese legislators may
want to add detailed provisions to the PRC Arbitration Law regarding cer-
tain procedural matters in ad hoc arbitration proceedings. This will be a
consistent approach, because the PRC Arbitration Law currently has a
chapter regarding procedural matters in institutional arbitration proceed-
ings.160 Possible procedural matters that the legislators may want to add
include the time period for and method of serving notice, arbitrator's fees,
default awards, and so on. Because these matters are usually provided for
in the arbitration rules that parties agree on, 161 it would be preferable for
the Chinese legislature to provide that the rules to be added in the PRC
Arbitration Law will apply as a minimum standard for due process, while
giving parties the right to override them as long as due process is
respected.
160. See Zhongcai Fa ({cRA) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), ch. 4 (China)
(English translation provided by the National People's Congress, available at http://
www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm).
161. See generally UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 8.
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Third, the law needs to ensure that ad hoc arbitration will obtain the
same safeguard mechanisms as institutional arbitration. For example, an
ad hoc tribunal's decision to take interim measures should receive the
same prompt and effective support from courts as those made in institu-
tional arbitration. Moreover, courts should treat ad hoc arbitration as
equal to institutional arbitration. They should not be prejudiced against
institutional arbitration in cases where, among others, a party challenges
an arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction, requests to set an award aside, or peti-
tions to enforce an award.
Finally, one cannot overlook the fact that because the PRC Arbitration
Law is premised on arbitration in China only being institutional, many of
the statute's rules are designed accordingly. For example, under the PRC
Arbitration Law, the jurisdiction of a court in a set-aside procedure is
decided by the residence of the arbitration commission; 162 the arbitrability
issue is decided by the arbitration commission rather than the tribunal;163
the official seal of the arbitration commission must be affixed to the
award164 and so on. As a result, incorporation of ad hoc arbitration entails
a complete and systematic revision of the PRC Arbitration Law. This is
before even considering the fact that many other related Chinese laws, such
as the PRC Civil Procedure Law, all share this same presumption that arbi-
tration is institutional.165 As such, whenever a Chinese law involves arbi-
tration agreements or awards, it invariably presumes that they are
institutional. Accordingly, completely legitimizing ad hoc arbitration
under Chinese law requires a complete review and revision of not only the
PRC Arbitration Law, but also all other relevant laws.
Conclusion
The PRC Arbitration Law requires that parties appoint an arbitration
institution in their arbitration agreement.166 Ad hoc arbitration agree-
ments, therefore, are invalid under this law. In practice, however, the Chi-
nese Supreme People's Court has adopted a choice-of-law rule ensuring
that ad hoc arbitration agreements will be enforced by Chinese courts if
the parties have explicitly chosen a non-Chinese law to govern the arbitra-
tion agreement's validity or place the seat of the ad hoc arbitration outside
162. Zhongcai Fa ({ VJA) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 58 (China) (English
translation provided by the National People's Congress, available at http://www.npc.gov.
cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm).
163. Id. art. 20.
164. Id. art. 54.
165. Minshi Susong Fa ([$ifyi4it) [Civil Procedure Law] (promulgated by Nat'l
People's Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991, revised Aug. 31, 2012), art. 257
(China) (English translation provided by the National People's Congress, available at
http://wvw.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383880.htm).
166. Zhongcai Fa ( {@gg ) [Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 16 (China) (English
translation provided by the National People's Congress, available at http://www.npc.gov.
cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm).
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Chinese territory. 167 Although not perfect, this validity-preferring and
pro-arbitration approach should be encouraged.
The real reasons behind the PRC Arbitration Law's hostility toward ad
hoc arbitration seem closely related to arbitration's historical development
in China, as well as to China's social and economic structures at the time
of the law's promulgation, particularly China's transition from a planned
economy to a market economy.168 At present however, all those reasons
essentially no longer exist. As China actively participates in the globaliza-
tion process, it is becoming more closely connected with the international
community. Because having a good arbitration system contributes to a
country's economic development and because the international commer-
cial arbitration system based on the New York Convention is highly inter-
connected, the existence of this unreasonable requirement in the PRC
Arbitration Law is surely counterproductive for the further development of
the Chinese arbitration field and China's continued economic develop-
ment. As a result, changing this unusual requirement is necessary for
China.
Complete incorporation of ad hoc arbitration into Chinese law, how-
ever, requires much more than the simple elimination of the PRC Arbitra-
tion Law's requirement that all arbitration agreements must be
institutional. Because of Chinese law's presumption that all arbitrations
seated in China are institutional, the complete incorporation of ad hoc arbi-
tration requires a systematic and perhaps even whole-scale rewriting of the
PRC Arbitration Law, as well as the revision of many other related Chinese
laws.
167. See discussion supra Parts I.B.2., 11.A.1.
168. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
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